Syndication arises when venture capitalists jointly invest in projects.
Introduction
One striking feature of venture-capital nance is that investments are often syndicated. This means that two or more venture capitalists share in the nancing of a particular venture.
1 Syndication frequently occurs even when the capitalization requirements of the venture are modest compared to the nancial resources of any one venture capitalist. The natural question to ask is why venture capitalists undertake syndication in such situations.
Syndication is not unique to venture capital, and also occurs with other types of investment. For that matter, any joint venture has a similar structure, as venture-capital syndication is just one example of a general phenomenon in which one party to a project brings in partners. Some of the insights drawn from our analysis should therefore be quite general. However, the motives for syndication may vary from case to case, and the model structures used here are designed to represent the venture-capital case. Our empirical analysis is based on information from the Canadian venture-capital industry.
One rationale for syndication, suggested by Lerner (1994) , is what we call the selection hypothesis. There might be an advantage to having more than one venture capitalist evaluate a project before it is selected for investment or, in a staged 2 investment setting, before additional investments are made. Syndication is a way for the rst, or lead, venture capitalist to bring other venture capitalists into the selection process. Even after its own evaluation of a venture investment, a venture capitalist might still be very unsure about the venture's prospects and might prefer to get the opinion of another venture capitalist. In effect, two (or more) independent venture capitalists might screen projects more effectively than one, because each learns something from the others' evaluation. This process could occur at the time of rst investment by a venture capitalist in the rm, or it could occur when additional or continuation investments are being considered by a venture capitalist. Thus syndication would lead to improved venture selection or continuation decisions.
1. Syndication is often taken to mean that two or more venture capitalist s share a particular round of nancing. Sometimes, however, the term is used more broadly to refer to situations where different venture capitalists invest in a given project at different times.
2. Venture-capital nancing is normally staged in that a venture will typically receive a modest initial investment from one or more venture capitalists , with additional investments from those (and possibly other) venture capitalist s coming in subsequent stages. See Gompers (1995) for a discussion and analysis of venture-capital staging based on the idea that staging is a valuable governance tool in the presence of potential agency problems.
One central objective in this paper is to provide a formal model of the selection hypothesis. Our second objective is to suggest and model an alternative hypothesis that we refer to as the value-added hypothesis. This second hypothesis is based on the idea that venture capitalists might add value to the ventures in which they invest. Our third objective is to test empirically the relative importance of these two hypotheses. Thus our analysis addresses the general question of whether venture capitalists are primarily engaged in venture selection or whether they are primarily engaged in managerial and related activities that add value to individual ventures. Lerner (1994) attributes the underlying idea for the selection hypothesis to Sah and Stiglitz (1986) , who provide a general model of organizational design and point out that it might sometimes be preferable to have a decision process in which a project must satisfy the evaluation of two separate observers, each of whom has veto power. Sah and Stiglitz (1986) do not mention venture-capital nance or any other nancial-sector applications, and it is not obvious that their model would apply to venture-capital. However, Lerner (1994) provides some data on the pattern of venture-capital investments in the biotechnology sector and interprets this evidence as being consistent with the selection hypothesis.
We model the selection hypothesis as a sequential sampling problem. This model implies that returns to syndicated investments should be lower than returns to standalone investments. Initially, a project is brought to the lead venture capitalist for consideration. This venture capitalist assesses the project. If the estimated project quality is sufciently low after this assessment, then the venture capitalist rejects the project outright, as there is little point in seeking a second opinion. At the other extreme, if the assessment yields a high expected value, then the venture capitalist accepts the project, as there is little need for a second opinion (i.e., little need for syndication) in this case either. The primary cost of syndicating is that the venture capitalist must share in the venture's proceeds. The venture capitalist would not want to incur this cost if a project were clearly acceptable.
The remaining possibility is that estimated project quality is in the intermediate range after the venture capitalist's initial assessment. It is therefore not clear whether the project should be accepted or rejected. This is the case in which a second opinion is valuable, leading the venture capitalist to pursue syndication. The most promising projects would be taken up as standalone investments, while projects of more moderate promise would be put in the syndication pool. This implies that standalone projects should, on average, yield higher returns than syndicated projects. Therefore, if improved selection is the central motivation for syndication, it follows that syndicated investments should, on average, have lower returns than standalone investments.
The other hypothesis we consider is the value-added hypothesis, under which venture capitalists are presumed to add value to ventures rather than simply trying to select the best ventures. From the lead venture capitalist's point of view, the bene t of seeking syndication is that the value of the project rises if other venture capitalists become involved. Different venture capitalists have different skills and information. Some might be helpful in organizing production, others might line up customers, others might contribute in human-resource management, etc. As under the selection hypothesis, the primary cost is that some share of the potentially pro table investment must be given up to secondary venture capitalists. Syndication will be sought in cases where the expected bene ts exceed the expected costs of syndication. If the value-added hypothesis is correct, then observed nancial returns should be higher for syndicated projects.
The implications of these two hypotheses allow a very direct test using data on returns. We have access to a database on returns to Canadian venture-capital investments collected by Macdonald & Associates. Using this data set, we nd that syndicated investments have signi cantly higher returns (in both the statistical and the economic sense) than standalone investments. Thus our analysis favors the value-added hypothesis over the selection hypothesis as a possible rationale for syndication. It also suggests that management rather than selection is at the heart of venture-capitalist activity.
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Both motives for syndication could be operating simultaneously. In that context, our empirical results indicate that the value-added hypothesis seems more important than the selection hypothesis. In addition to the two hypotheses we formulate and test, there are also other possible rationales for syndication. In particular, one hypothesis suggested but not tested by Lerner (1994) is the risk-sharing hypothesis. The idea is that venture capitalists undertake syndication so as to diversify their portfolios and reduce overall risk. We provide some evidence on the role of risk sharing and conclude that risk sharing may be present. A related idea is that syndication might arise from capital constraints: a venture capitalist might not have enough 3. Gorman and Sahlman (1989) describe survey evidence on venture-capital activity that suggests that venture capitalist s report themselves as being actively engaged in both selection, or portfolio, activities and in managerial activities. Hellmann and Puri (2000, 2002) provide evidence that is consistent with the idea that venture capitalists add value through managerial activities in the venture.
resources on hand to fully nance a large venture. The evidence we have suggests that such constraints are unlikely to be a major explanation for syndication.
There are other possible reasons for syndication that we do not test. One possibility is collusion: by banding together rather than competing, venture capitalists might improve their bargaining position with entrepreneurs. Another possibility is that syndication has an in uence on control rights in the venture, as the question of who controls the venture is an important consideration in venture-capital nance. (See Kaplan and Strömberg, 1999.) A related idea is that potential agency problems can be mitigated by syndication. In particular, Admati and P eiderer (1994) provide a formal model in which venture capitalists can avoid agency problems by maintaining a constant share of ownership in a particular venture over time. This suggests a role for syndication if other venture capitalists are sought as alternative investors.
The role of syndication in venture capital is frequently discussed in the business press and in the descriptive literature on venturecapital nance. [See, for example, Kunze (1990) and Perez (1986) .] However, the formal academic literature on venture-capital syndication is modest in scope. Aside from Lerner (1994) , we are not aware of any published academic papers in which the rationale for venturecapital syndication is the central focus, although, as implied by previous paragraphs, some of the existing literature on venture-capital nance does bear on the syndication question. Uncertainty and information acquisition are central to our formal models, but our analysis abstracts from the "agency" perspective that has been in uential in the analysis of venture-capital nance. [See, for example, Amit et al. (1998) .] We recognize that agency considerations might be relevant in explaining the motivation for venture-capital syndication, as in Admati and Pleiderer (1994) and Hellman (1998), but we believe that it is also important to consider the pure learning, selection, and managerial issues that we emphasize.
Section 2 provides a brief description of the venture-capital industry. Section 3 provides a formal development of the selection hypothesis, Section 4 formalizes the value-added hypothesis, Section 5 describes the data used to test these hypotheses, and Section 6 describes our econometric analysis. Section 7 provides consideration of the risk aversion and scale hypotheses, and Section 8 contains concluding remarks.
A Brief Description of the Venture Capital Industry
Unlike most other parts of the nancial sector, the venture-capital industry lacks a precise legal or regulatory de nition. The core activity de ning venture capital is investment in privately held companies, although venture capitalists sometimes hold shares of companies even after they have gone public. The willingness to make equity investments is also a de ning characteristic, and venture capitalists typically provide a mix of debt and equity nancing. The intermediation aspect of venture capital is what distinguishes venture capitalists from wealthy individuals (often called "angels") who invest their own money in edgling companies. The venture capitalist obtains money from arm's-length investors-often pension funds and other institutional investors-and from individuals, and pools this money with internal resources. The capacity to be actively involved in the management of young companies is also an important characteristic of venture capitalists, although this capacity is not used in all investments. Venture capitalists usually operate by setting up funds, or partnerships, often with a xed time horizon, and sometimes with a particular target set of investors. A single venture capitalist will typically have several funds.
Venture-capital nance is a dynamic activity in that there are many stages in the nancing process. The categorization of different stages is somewhat arbitrary, but it makes sense to distinguish ve stages. The earliest stage is referred to as seed investment and may occur before a company is founded. Seed investments are often based on a single individual with an idea and relevant expertise, and the venture capitalist may assist in forming a company. The next chronological stage is startup investment, which normally refers to investments made after a company exists but before sales occur. The next stage is the early growth phase, which corresponds to the period after the rst initial sales but before sales become a major source of nance for ongoing operations. The fourth stage is referred to as "follow-on" or "mezzanine" or later-stage nancing. Finally there may be a stage of nancing focused on a speci c purpose for a mature privately held company, including turnaround investments and leveraged buyouts.
Within each stage there may be more than one round of investments. The amount of time associated with each stage is variable, but a horizon of about a year each is typical for the rst three stages. Laterstage nancing more commonly stretches out over two or more years, and special-purpose investments are usually one-time investments that might be made anytime after the rst three stages are complete.
When we think of venture capital, we often think of seed and startup investment, but these stages are less important quantitatively than subsequent stages. In our data, obtained from Macdonald & Associates and described in more detail in Section 5, we have fairly complete records on the venture-capital investment history of Canadian companies founded in 1990 or later that ultimately received venture-capital nancing from Canadian venture capitalists. In this population, a few (1% ) received their rst venture-capital investment in the calendar year preceding the founding of the company. These are de nitely seed investments. A further 21% received their rst investment in the same calendar year that the venture company was founded. These would be a mixture of seed and startup investments. Another 10% received their rst investment in the calendar year subsequent to founding. This would include some investments that qualify as startup investments and some early growth-stage investments. An additional 7% of ventures received their rst investment in the second calendar year subsequent to being founded. The median time from founding to rst venture-capital investment is between three and four years.
Syndication, if it occurs, normally occurs soon after the rst venture-capital investment. Speci cally, of those ventures that received investments from more than one venture capitalist, about 70% received an investment from a second venture capitalist within the same calendar year as the initial investment by the lead venture capitalist. We can think of three major patterns for syndicated investments. The most common pattern is that rst investment from a venture capitalist occurs in the early growth stage or later, with syndication occurring simultaneously or shortly after. The second pattern is that the lead venture capitalist makes a seed or startup investment, followed by syndication at a later stage. In such cases the experience of the lead venture capitalist will in uence future investments, as a poor outcome at the seed or startup phase (as judged by
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the lead venture capitalist) may lead to termination of the venture. The third and least common pattern is that syndication occurs at the seed or startup stage. Under all patterns the lead venture capitalist is the primary decision-maker over whether syndication occurs.
As illustrated in Figure 1 , one other important feature of venturecapital nance in Canada over the sample period is that the amount of it increased with time, as did syndication. The bars show the share of all new venture-capital investments in a given year that are syndicated in the (narrow) sense that two or more venture capitalists invest in a given venture in the same calendar year. Thus, in 1992 about 40% of all new investments were components in syndicated projects. The line shows the total number of new venture-capital investments.
A Formal Model of the Selection Hypothesis
We construct the simplest model we can that allows rigorous formulation of our research question. 4 We assume that a project or venture arrives at time t 1 for consideration by a lead venture capitalist. We assume, without loss of generality, that the project has a required investment of 1. The project will yield a (nonnegative) cash ow. If this cash ow is zero, then the entire investment is lost. The venture capitalist's problem is to investigate the project and decide whether to accept it or reject it.
This investigation consists of independent trials, each of which yields a signal. The signal is binary in that it can take on only two possible values: positive (good) or negative (bad). We can then write the expected cash ow from the venture as R(j , N ), where j is the number of positive signals and N is the number of trials. Each signal is assumed to be informative, as de ned by the following conditions:
and
Condition (1) states that expected cash ows are higher if there are more positive signals in a given number of trials. Condition (2) states that expected cash ows decrease if it takes more trials to get a given number of positive signals. The simplest information structure that allows for the different information states we require is to assume that the venture capitalist's investigation is equivalent to two trials. This allows the information to be good (two positive signals), bad (two negative signals), or intermediate (one signal of each type). At time t 2 the venture capitalist chooses among three possible actions: outright rejection, outright acceptance, and seeking syndication. If the venture capitalist seeks syndication, then additional venture capitalists are approached. These secondary venture capitalists evaluate the project and provide a recommendation to accept or reject. This evaluation is treated as a third trial, and the recommendation as a third signal for the lead venture capitalist, who then makes a nal decision to accept the project as a syndicated project or to reject it. An implicit assumption is that the lead venture capitalist cannot simply purchase (at relevant cost) an extra signal from a consultant or outside source. To get the extra information it is necessary to seek syndication. Figure 2 illustrates this decision-making sequence.
To explain syndication we need to analyze the decision node that occurs at time t 2 . We assume that the venture capitalist is risk-neutral and thus seeks the action with the highest expected value. If the venture capitalist rejects the project, then available funds are placed in an alternative investment. We de ne r as the expected gross cash ow per unit investment in this alternative. If the project goes ahead under syndication, the lead venture capitalist provides an (exogenous) share a < 1 of the required investment, with the rest being provided by the other syndicating venture capitalists. The amount 1 a that the lead venture capitalist has left over out of the original potential investment is invested in the alternative asset and will therefore return expected cash ow (1 a )r.
FIGURE 2. DECISION STRUCTURE FOR LEAD VENTURE CAPITALIST
The lead venture capitalist maximizes expected value and will therefore compare the expected values from the three possible actions at time 2 and select the action with the highest expected value. We impose the following structural assumption on the expected returns to ensure that rejection, acceptance, and syndication are all feasible possibilities:
Here R(1, 2) is the expected return from one positive signal out of two trials. This is assumed to be less than the alternative investment value, r. On the other hand, the expected return from two positive signals out of three trials exceeds this alternative. We now state the main properties of the model in the form of propositions.
Proposition 1: (i) The lead venture capitalist will reject the project outright if the initial two signals are negative. (ii) The lead venture capitalist will accept the project outright if the initial two signals are positive. (iii) The lead venture capitalist will seek syndication if the two initial signals differ in sign.
Proof. (i): If the two initial signals are negative, the expected return under outright acceptance is R(0, 2) , whereas the expected return under outright rejection (and consequent investment in the alternative) is r. Using (1) and (3), R(0, 2) < R(1, 2) < r, so outright rejection dominates outright acceptance. In addition, rejection dominates seeking syndication. If syndication is sought, the best possible expected return to the project after trial 3 is R(1, 3) . Under syndication the lead venture capitalist's expected value after trial 3 would be a R(1, 3) ( 1 a )r, where a < 1. This must be less than r, as (2) and (3) imply that R( 1, 3) < R(1, 2) < r. Thus, after two initial negative signals, rejection dominates even the best possible outcome under the syndication option.
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(ii): The expected return from outright acceptance after two initial positive signals is R(2, 2) . From (1), (2), and (3) it follows that R(2, 2) > R(2, 3) > r, which implies that outright acceptance dominates outright rejection. Syndicated acceptance also dominates rejection, but syndication merely dilutes whatever return arises, as the lead venture capitalist would receive only a share a < 1 of this return. Outright acceptance is therefore preferred.
(iii): If the two initial signals differ, it follows from (3) that the lead venture capitalist will not accept the project outright, as R(1, 2) < r. However, the project would be worthwhile if the potential syndicating partners were positive (i.e., if the third signal were positive), as R(2, 3) > r. Therefore, seeking syndication dominates outright rejection, as the lead venture capitalist will either end up rejecting anyway, and still receive return r, or accept part of a syndicated project with an expected return exceeding r.
Proposition 2: Syndicated projects will be lower in expected value than standalone projects. Therefore, observed syndicated projects should have a lower average return than observed standalone projects.
Proof. From Proposition 1 we infer that standalone accepted projects have expected return R(2, 2), whereas syndicated projects have expected return R(2, 3). It follows from (2) that R(2, 2) > R(2, 3).
The logic of Proposition 2 is that high-quality projects are more likely to yield two initial positive signals and are therefore more likely to be accepted outright than lower-quality projects. Intermediatequality projects are more likely to generate an intermediate initial information pattern and are therefore more likely to be considered for syndication. 5. The lead venture capitalist could always reject after considering syndication, in which case seeking syndication would be equivalent to outright rejection. We break this tie in favor of outright rejection on the grounds that if we incorporated even slight concessions to additional realism such as discounting or transaction costs, then outright rejection would be strictly preferred.
6. Other structures with more ambiguous outcomes are possible. For example, if new ventures are immediately identi ed by the lead venture capitalist as coming from
The Value-Added Hypothesis
The idea underlying the value-added hypothesis is that the lead venture capitalist seeks syndication to enhance the performance of the venture. This contrasts with the selection hypothesis, under which syndication helps to select the best projects but does not affect the performance of any venture. As in the selection model, we assume that a representative venture or project requires capitalization normalized to 1 and that the expected cash ow or payoff is R. We need to abstract from the selection problem considered in the previous model, so we assume that R is known unconditionally and is not affected by learning.
As before, there are alternative investments available that return expected cash ow r. If R > r, then standalone acceptance will be preferred to rejection. Assuming, as before, that ties are decided in favor of rejection, if r R then rejection is preferred to standalone acceptance. Under the value-added model, syndication increases the expected return of some projects. The value added to the project from syndication is denoted '. The expected payoff if the project is syndicated is therefore R '. A project might not bene t at all from syndication, or it might bene t substantially. To keep the analysis simple we assume that ' can take on only two possible values, v or 0:
v with probability ¼, 0 with probability (1 ¼).
As before, if syndication occurs, the lead venture capitalist takes on a fraction a of the project, and therefore invests only a in the project, with 1 a being invested in the outside alternative. As the outside alternative returns cash ow r per unit invested, an investment of 1 a returns cash ow (1 a )r. We assume that v is large enough to make syndication attractive relative to standalone investment. De ning R as the upper bound on the expected value of a standalone project, we therefore require the following condition:
As in the selection model, the lead venture capitalist chooses to reject the project (action 1), accept the project on a standalone basis (action 2), or seek syndication (action 3). This choice is made after one of two distributions, one of which has a high mean and a high variance, then syndication (i.e., more information) might be sought in the high-mean, high-variance cases. However, the structure underlying Propositions 1 and 2 seems to capture the central insight regarding selection effects.
observing '. In this model, syndication will always occur if the lead venture capitalist chooses action 3.
It is useful to form the differences between the expected values. Using d ij to represent the difference between the expected values of actions i and j , we can write the following:
In practice R and ' might be correlated, but we make the inessential and algebraically convenient assumption that R and ' are independent: the value added of syndication does not depend on the underlying project quality. Proposition 3 states the conditions under which standalone investment, syndication, and project rejection will be chosen.
Proposition 3: (i) Standalone investment will be chosen if and only if R > r and ' 0. (ii) Syndication will be chosen if and only if ' v and R > r v. (iii) Rejection will be chosen if and only if (a) ' 0 and h r, or (b) ' v and R r v.
Proof. See Appendix.
We can see from Proposition 3 that syndication hinges, as we would expect, on the project being one for which syndication actually provides added value. Otherwise, either rejection or standalone investment would be preferred. Proposition 3 indicates that v is large enough relative to R that syndication is preferred to standalone investment for those situations where syndication adds value. The lead venture capitalist will not choose to "cherry pick" the very best projects for standalone investment.
In order to compare the expected returns to syndicated and standalone investments, it is necessary to make some distributional assumptions about R. We assume that R is uniform on the interval [0, R ]. We take this as a neutral case, and it has the advantage of providing computational simplicity. Recall that R is the expected value, not the realized value. Realized values are highly skewed, but expected values are based on a high level of ignorance and might perhaps be taken as uniform.
Proposition 4:
The expected rate of return to syndication exceeds the expected rate of return to standalone investment.
It might seem obvious that average returns from syndication will exceed average returns from standalone investment, as venture-capital rms will seek to syndicate in precisely those cases where syndication has high value added. However, adding value through syndication might allow a project that would fail the standalone standard to be accepted for syndication. This might tend to lower the return of syndicated projects relative to standalone projects. The relative importance of this effect depends on a , on the correlation between ' and R, and on the distribution of R.
The role of a arises because syndication has a cost to the lead venture capitalist in that the project must be shared. This cost will be borne only for those projects that yield a suf ciently high value added from syndication. This is the key effect that tends to make the aggregate return to syndicated projects higher, and this effect is stronger if a (the lead venture capitalist's share under syndication) is smaller. Second, we have assumed that the value from syndication, ', is uncorrelated with the intrinsic quality of the project as re ected by R. Alternatively, if we made the plausible assumption that ' is positively correlated with R, then this would also tend to make syndicated projects have a higher return than standalone projects, as the very good projects would tend to be those that also offered high returns from syndication. Therefore, the assumption that ' is additive and uncorrelated is conservative. The distribution of R is relevant because we need to rule out the possibility that adding v in an uncorrelated way to the expected value R moves a large mass of the expected-value distribution from being unacceptable to being marginally acceptable under syndication. This would seem an unlikely possibility that would be ruled out by many reasonable alternative assumptions. The uniform distribution is simple and suf cient, and should be regarded as an illustrative example.
Data
The two models presented in Sections 2 and 3 have strikingly different implications for the pattern of returns to venture-capital investments. The selection hypothesis implies that syndicated investments should have lower rates of return than standalone investments. In contrast, the value-added hypothesis suggests that syndicated investments should have higher expected rates of return than standalone investments. To test the relative empirical strength of these hypotheses we therefore need data on returns to venture-capital investments.
The data used for this study were collected by Macdonald & Associates and made available to us on an anonymous and con dential basis. In addition, no speci c information related to a single rmventure or venture capitalist-is reported or discussed. The data are derived from several surveys conducted by Macdonald & Associates. The most important survey for our purposes is the exit survey, which records information about the divestiture of venture-capitalist investments for the period from 1992 through 1997, plus the rst quarter of 1998. These divestments, or exits, can occur in several ways. For unsuccessful ventures, the venture capitalist might exit simply by writing off the investment. For more successful ventures, the venture capitalist might exit by selling its shares to a third party as part of a private third-party acquisition. If the venture goes public in an initial public offering (IPO) and the venture capitalist subsequently sells its holding, this is recorded as an IPO. There are three other types of exit in the data. One type is the management buyout (MBO), in which the venture capitalist sells its share to managers or of cers of the venture itself. Another type of exit is the secondary sale, in which the venture capitalist's holding is sold in a private sale to a third party, but not as part of an overall third-party acquisition. In the last type of exit, called "other," the exit vehicle was not reported. There are 584 exits in the data, including partial exits in which some but not all of the venture capitalist's holding is divested. Figure 3 shows the distribution of exit by exit vehicle.
The exit survey records the value of the venture capitalist's divestment. It also records the cost of obtaining the investment in the FIGURE 3. VENTURE-CAPITAL EXITS rst place. Thus, for example, the venture capitalist might acquire a block of shares for $1 million and subsequently sell it for $2 million. The apparent nominal return would then be 100%. It is, of course, important to know the holding period of the investment, so that an annualized rate of return can be calculated. Unfortunately, the holding period is not reported directly in the exit survey. It can, however, be inferred in principle from a related survey carried out by Macdonald & Associates, referred to as the investment survey, which tracks the timing of investments made by the venture capitalists. We say "in principle" because full prior investment information is not available for all exits. Of the 584 total exits, we can calculate holding periods and can therefore calculate annualized (real) rates of return for 393. For the other 191 exits, we know the aggregate nominal return but not the holding period.
It is possible to estimate the holding period for those investments using other characteristics of the data. For the data with known holding periods we form a regression equation that "explains" the holding period. The explanatory variables for this regression are industry, location, the investment round, and exit vehicle. This regression equation can then be used to predict the holding period for those observations where it is missing. The predicted holding periods, 7 while noisy, contain some useful information in the sense that a signi cant part of the variation in estimated returns is due to actual variation in annualized returns, and the rest of the variation can be viewed as noise. Restricting attention to just the 393 observations with known holding periods would involve wasting the information contained in the investment-cost and value information for the other exits. We therefore consider the extended 584-observation dataset as well as the smaller 393-observation dataset. We refer to these as the extended and primary datasets respectively. We report results for both datasets, although we put the main emphasis on the primary dataset.
Macdonald & Associates seeks to track all venture-capital investments in Canada made by Canadian venture capitalists. While the coverage is not complete, information is obtained on the vast majority of such investments. Fortunately for our purposes, the data contain information on syndication. Thus, for each exit made by a venture 7. The holding-period regressions have only a modest corrected R 2 of 0.19. The location variables include dummy variables for Quebec and the West, with the base being the rest (mostly Ontario). The industry dummy variables are manufacturing, biotech, and computers and communications, with the base being the rest. The exit dummies are as shown in Figure 3 . We also use an activity counter associated with an exit. Any investment or exit counts, so if an exit has a count of, say 5, this would mean that the exit was the fth recorded investment or exit event for this venture. Holding periods are increasing in this variable.
capitalist, we know if other venture capitalists also had investments in that venture, and we know, in most cases, when that investment occurred.
The unit of observation for the analysis in subsequent sections is the completed venture-capital investment. (In contrast, the data described in Section 2 are based on all venture-capital investments, not just completed investments.) For example, venture capitalist A might make an investment in rm 1, and get shares in the rm in return. At some future time, this investment might be sold, and a rate of return could then be calculated. This record would form one observation in the dataset used for subsequent sections. Venture capitalist B might also make an investment in rm 1 and might subsequently sell its share as well. This investment would be a second observation. Note that the rate of return to B could be quite different from that to A for investments in the same venture. In addition, venture capitalist C might also invest in rm 1, but might not have sold its share by the time of the latest survey in the dataset. This investment by C would not be recorded as a completed investment and would therefore not be a record or observation in our dataset.
There are two possible de nitions of syndication (as described in footnote 1). The narrow de nition is that syndication occurs when two venture capitalists make investments simultaneously. The broader de nition allows investments to count as syndicated investments regardless of whether the investments occurred at the same or different times. Operationally, if investments by different venture capitalists occur in the same calendar year, we treat this as satisfying the narrow de nition. Broadly de ned syndication occurs if a second venture capitalist invests in the venture at any time, provided there is some overlap among venture capitalists in time.
One potential dif culty is that venture capitalist A might make an investment and exit fully at a later time, followed, at a still later time, by an investment from B. Such a situation should not be viewed as syndication. However, if these three steps (investment by A, full exit by A, and entry by B) all occurred in one calendar year, this would mistakenly count as a syndicated investment in the narrow sense. This is at most a very small problem in our data. Of 171 narrowly syndicated investments, only 10 have an investment and exit by the same rm in the same year, and most of these can determined to be genuine syndications by carefully inspecting the data. We believe that at most one or two cases are false syndications.
For the broad de nition of syndication, false positives could indeed be a problem. Exits are observed from the rst quarter of 1992 through the rst quarter of 1998, so this does give time for full exit by one venture capitalist and subsequent investment by another. We address this problem as follows. First we take all narrow syndications. Then we add all situations where a second venture capitalist entered in a calendar year subsequent to the rst one's investment. We then remove all cases where the rst venture capitalist had an exit in a prior year to the second one's investment. This will unfortunately eliminate cases where the rst venture capitalist only sells part of its holding before the second one joins. We therefore add back those cases where the rst one has another exit following the second one's investment, as this indicates that overlap did occur. Overall, the broad syndication variable should be a reliable indicator of overlapping investment by venture capitalists.
There are 171 (out of 584) narrow syndications in the extended data set, and 147 (out of 393) in the primary data set. Using the broader de nition of syndication, there are 243 (out of 584) syndicated investments in the extended data set, and 194 (out of 393) in the primary data set. Even though broad syndications cover a much longer period (6 years) than narrow syndications (1 year), moving from narrow to broad increases the number of syndications by only about 30% in the primary database and about 40% in the extended database. We report results for both the narrow and broad de nitions of syndication.
Our data do not track syndication attempts that do not yield syndication. Therefore, we cannot observe cases of syndication giving a "bad signal." This does not compromise the statistical tests we carry out. The quality and nature of the data we have are, to our knowledge, unique and allow more direct evaluation of the rationale for syndication than has previously been possible.
Estimation and Results
The empirical test is straightforward in principle. We wish to see whether syndicated or standalone investments have higher returns. We use two approaches. First we compare the mean returns of the two classes of investment. We also use regression analysis. The rate of return is the annualized arithmetic (or simple) real rate of return. 8 The 8. We use the arithmetic (simple) rate of return rather than the geometric (compounded) rate because the arithmetic rate allows a much more satisfactory treatment of write-offs, which represent a signi cant share of the dataset. If a write-off occurs, then the geometric rate of return is 100% per year, regardless of the holding period. Thus, for example, if a $1-million investment is written off to 0 after 4 years, the only way this can occur under geometric compounding is if the loss in the rst year is 100%. Any rate of return less (in absolute value) than 100% would imply that something must be left after 4 years. The arithmetic rate of return is simply 25% per year, which is much more likely to approximate the actual loss in value. Table I reports t-tests of the null hypothesis that the mean rates of return for syndicated investments and standalone investments are the same against the (two-sided) alternative that they differ, carried out under the presumption of unequal variances. In the row reporting estimated differences, standard errors are reported in square brackets. Two asterisks indicate signi cance at the 5% level or better. Table 1 shows that the syndicated investments had substantially higher average returns for all four data classi cations than the standalone investments. The absolute difference in rates of return is large, as standalone investments had average rates on the order of 15% to 20% whereas the syndicated investments had average returns of about 35% to 39%. Because of the underlying variability in rates of return and the modest sample sizes, the t-statistics are not particularly large, but they are signi cant at the 5% level for three of the four classications, including the "primary, narrow" case, which we take as the most important. The signi cance levels are with respect to the two-sided alternative that the two groups of investments have different means. If we considered the one-sided alternative that syndicated investments have a higher mean return, then the signi cance levels would be stronger (i.e., smaller), and even the "extended, narrow" case would allow rejection of the null hypothesis at better than the 10% signi cance level.
Using t-tests to Evaluate Differences in Average Returns
Therefore, if we treat the dataset as a sample, we reject the null hypothesis of equality in favor of the alternative that the syndicated investments have higher returns. Arguably, however, we might treat the data sets as a population rather than a sample, in which case we would simply observe that the syndicated investments in fact have much larger returns on average than the standalone investments.
The means test show a clear and striking pattern. Even though the distributions of returns for standalone and syndicated investments overlap (as implied by the standard errors), the differences in average returns are so great that we might wonder if some sort of selection bias could be present. One type of selection bias that might seem plausible is that syndication partners seek to sign on with successful ventures after observing early signs of success.
This effect is sometimes called window dressing, as venture capitalists try to make themselves look good by becoming associated with successful ventures. Presumably the secondary partners in such syndications would earn only normal returns, but the lead venture capitalist would earn large returns and this would be enough to bias the returns. If this is true, however, it should apply more forcefully to the broadly de ned syndications, and should not really apply to the narrowly de ned syndications, which take place within the same year, and which normally occur well before returns are realized. Looking at the primary dataset, however, we see that the differences in average returns are nearly the same for narrowly de ned syndications as for broad, suggesting that this selection bias is either absent or very modest. Also, the mere fact that most syndications are narrow suggests that not many venture capitalists are joining late. More formal (regression) analysis shows no signi cant effect of time between investments on returns. Overall, we see little or no evidence of window dressing in our data.
Using Regression Analysis to Evaluate Differences in Returns
It is possible that the pattern found in Section 6.1 is induced by a failure to correct for other relevant factors. Perhaps, for example, some industries differentially attract syndication and also have higher returns. We do have several variables in the dataset that we might wish to correct for in a regression analysis. In particular, each exit is associated with one of six industries: computing and communications, electrical components, manufacturing, biomedical and pharmaceuticals, other health-related, and other. A dummy variable (comp) for the computing-and-communications sector is signi cant as an explanatory variable for returns, while the other industries are not signi cant. More precisely, the returns to the computing-and-communications sector are signi cantly different from the returns to the aggregate of the other sectors, while the other sectors are not signi cantly different from one another.
9 One other important explanatory variable is PTS, which stands for "preferential tax status." Some venture-capital funds enjoy preferential tax status that allows them to raise money more cheaply than other funds. This leads to an overall explanatory regression for the rate of return of the following form:
where SYN is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 for syndicated investments and 0 for standalone investments. PTS and COMP are also dummy variables. In Table II , the rst row indicates whether the dataset being used is the extended one or the primary one, and whether the broad or the narrow de nition of syndication is used. The second row shows the coef cient associated with the dummy variable for syndication. This coef cient is an estimate of the net value of syndication arising from the positive in uence of the value-added effect and the negative in uence of the selection effect. The narrow syndication dummy variable in the extended dataset is not quite signi cant at the 10% level. However, the overall pattern is consistent with the t-tests on the means and con rms that syndicated investments tend to have higher returns than standalone investments.
The computer and communications sector did well compared to other sectors, and this is a signi cant effect. Also, as one would expect, the tax-advantaged funds had lower rates of return than the others. This makes sense because the tax-advantaged funds offer tax 9. Since we use industry dummies to predict holding periods to construct the extended dataset, the reader might prefer to focus on the primary dataset for this analysis.
advantages to underlying investors in the venture fund and therefore require a lower threshold return for their investors than do other funds. However, the apparent size of this effect is larger than might be expected.
Correcting for Other Factors
There are other factors that might be important in determining returns. In particular, we might anticipate scale effects if either economies of scale or capital constraints induce an apparent advantage from size. If syndicated investments give rise to larger ventures, then perhaps it is scale rather than syndication that explains differences in returns. We might also expect the year of exit to be important (i.e., returns to be higher in good years than in bad), and the age of the venture, as well. It is possible to correct for all these factors. As it turns out, they are all insigni cant, and do not affect the main ndings concerning syndication, and this remains true for various permutations of speci cation. In the interest of providing some insight into the performance of these variables, in Table III we report results incorporating all these effects.
Some of the new included variables have missing data. We are therefore forced to drop some observations, leading to fewer observations than in the corresponding regressions reported in Table II of the additional control variables is age of the venture in years, measured as the time from business formation, which may precede incorporation. Most ventures are young, but there are some ventures that are relatively old, as rms can sometimes exist for a long time before seeking venture-capital nancing, especially for turnaround and LBO investments. About 10% of the ventures in the dataset report an age of 20 years or more. Because the distribution of age is skewed to the right, we use the natural log of age. This variable is, however, insigni cant. The estimated absolute effect of log(age) is small, and the standard errors are relatively large. Using raw (i.e., unlogged) age yields even less signi cant results and does not affect the coef cients on the other variables.
The regressions shown in Table III use the variable "employment" (measured by the number of employees in the venture). This is supposed to capture the size or scale of the venture. Employment is not an ideal measure of size, as it does not directly capture the amount of physical capital or other factors that contribute to total productive capacity. However, for most relatively young small private companies, the major expense and the major asset is the employees, so employment should capture an important element of scale. We have another variable that re ects size, which is the total investment in the venture by all venture capitalists. These two measures of scale have a signi cant positive correlation coef cient of 0.37, suggesting that they are both capturing some underlying size concept, but also suggesting that they might be capturing some different aspects of scale as well. However, regardless of whether we include one or the other or both of these variables, the scale effect is not signi cant, the syndication effect is signi cant, and the estimates and signi cance of syndication are only marginally affected.
The other factor we correct for is timing of the exit, using dummy variables to represent the year of exit. (The base year is 1992.) These dummy variables are insigni cant, although the absolute level of returns does vary substantially on average from year to year. However, the variation across ventures is large compared to the variation over time. We tried using a time trend (not reported), without nding signi cant results, but it is clear from the pattern of the dummy variables that a time trend would not capture much. We also tried using a variable to capture the phase of the business cycle, which also was not signi cant. There are other variables that might serve as controls, 10 but after substantial speci cation testing we concluded that the syndication effect is robust, as are the tax-status effect and the computer-industry effect.
Degrees of Syndication
So far we have treated syndication as a dummy variable-either syndication occurs, or it does not occur. However, it is possible to treat syndication more nely, as we know the number of syndicating venture capitalists associated with each venture. Of the 584 exits in the data set, 341 are standalone, 108 involve two venture capitalists, 59 involve three venture capitalists, 28 involve four venture capitalists, etc. Table IV reports the results of a regression similar to equation (10), except that we use the number of syndicating venture capitalists rather than just a syndication dummy variable.
We use only the broad de nition of syndication in Table IV , as there is some ambiguity about exactly how the counts should be done for the narrow de nition. For example, the appropriate classi cation if two venture-capital investments are simultaneous and one more is preexisting is not obvious. In any case, Table IV indicates that a larger number of venture capitalists is associated with increased returns, as we would expect from the value-added hypothesis. Table IV suggests that value is increasing in the number of venture capitalists. There is insuf cient evidence to suggest whether that the success of the venture largely determines the mode of exit. Successful ventures lead to exists in the form of IPOs and acquisitions. Less successful ventures normally lead to management buyouts or secondary sales, and the least successful ventures lead to write-offs. Thus exit type is largely determined by the returns and should not be included as an explanatory variable for returns in an ordinary least-squares regression. The problem with using location of the venture as an explanatory variable is that location is largely insigni cant except for one effect-Quebec. However, it is primarily Quebec venture capitalist s who have preferential tax status, so including location would induce collinearity with the tax-status variable. Our judgment is that it is the tax-status effect that is fundamental, not location per se, so we do not correct for location. this effect might be subject to either increasing or decreasing returns. When we introduce a quadratic term (the number of venture capitalists squared), the extra term is insigni cant and the adjusted R 2 falls. Similarly, if we use the log of the number of venture capitalists instead of the raw number, the adjusted R 2 falls and the signi cance of the explanatory variable is slightly reduced. In short, there is very little evidence to suggest that the relationship is anything other than linear, although there are insuf cient data to place much weight on this nding regarding functional form.
The Risk-Sharing and Scale Hypotheses
In this paper we focus on two competing and possibly complementary rationales for syndication: selection and value added, and we assume that venture capitalists are risk-neutral. However, it is also plausible that risk aversion might be a motive for syndication, as venture capitalists might seek to share the risk associated with a particular venture. Equivalently, we might say that by syndicating, each venture capitalist is able to invest in more ventures, given the size of its pool of investment capital, and thus achieve (potentially) greater diversication.
Furthermore, as pointed out by a referee, it might be dif cult to distinguish between the risk-sharing hypothesis and the value-added hypothesis. Depending on the joint distribution of risk and return across the population of available investments and on the precise speci cation of the venture capitalists' attitudes toward risk, it is possible that we could observe a set of high-risk, high-return syndicated ventures. This could induce a higher ex post return for syndicated ventures. Thus risk sharing is an alternative explanation for the results of Section 6.
It is dif cult to test the importance of risk sharing. The relevant risk consideration from the venture capitalist's point of view is the contribution of a given investment to the overall portfolio risk, and this depends on the investment's entire covariance structure vis-à-vis other investments in the venture capitalist's portfolio, including the various investments that are not in our dataset. However, if the total contribution of an investment to the venture capitalist's risk is correlated with its own variance, then we might expect a risk-sharing motive to cause syndicated investments to exhibit more variability than standalone investments, as venture capitalists would seek syndication over more risky investments so as to allow themselves more diversi cation. Syndicated investments do have higher variability in our data. The returns to syndicated investments (broad de nition) have a standard deviation of 100.2, while the standard deviation of standalone investments is 80.3. Using a variance-ratio test for the difference of standard deviations, this difference is signi cant at the 1% level, suggesting that risk sharing might be a plausible partial explanation for syndication.
Another relevant piece of information concerns the size of a typical investment, relative to the size of a typical venture capitalist. We would expect risk aversion to be more important if the capital requirements of a venture are large compared to the resources of the interested venture capitalists. The size measure we have for a venture is investment in the venture by venture capitalists in the dataset. The size measure we have for venture capitalists is their total investments recorded in the dataset. As many venture capitalists have substantial "passive" investments (treasury bills, money-market investments, etc.) and have investments in other countries or in other types of assets as well, this is likely to signi cantly understate the size of the venture capitalist. In addition, many venture capitalists are subsidiaries of much larger nancial institutions. However, using our limited de nition of size, the Table V shows the mean and several percentiles of the size distribution for ventures and for venture capitalists.
The table includes all venture capitalists with ve or more investments in the dataset. These venture capitalists account for 94% of all investments. The other venture capitalists would consist mostly of investors who are primarily invested in other countries or in areas other than venture capital. This table covers all 2889 ventures in the database, not just those where exits have occurred. The table shows that typical ventures are small compared to typical venture capitalists, and this effect would be stronger if we had the total nancial portfolios of venture capitalists. However, the larger ventures are signi cant in size relative to the smaller venture capitalists, so this table would not rule out the possibility of risk aversion playing a signi cant role for some investments.
Our informal discussions with practitioners suggest that venture capitalists, of all nancial intermediaries, seem most conscious of being willing to take risks. Still, we recognize that risk sharing might play a signi cant role. Collusion would also offer an explanation as to why syndicated returns are higher. However, we can at least still infer that the selection effect is not the major factor in determining the pattern of relative returns to standalone and syndicated ventures.
Table V also sheds light on whether capital constraints might play a role in syndication. Syndication is more likely to occur in cases where a single venture capitalist is not large enough to fully nance the venture-capital needs of a particular venture. Considering that scale effects are not signi cant in explaining venture-capital returns, the capital constraint effect would seem unlikely to bias the pattern of returns in favor of syndicated investments, so it is less of a concern than risk sharing. Still, it is useful to know if capital constraints are important. Table V does not rule out capital constraints being important in some cases, but such constraints would rarely be an issue for the larger venture capitalists who do most venture-capital investing.
One other data-related point to consider is that a project that provides above-normal returns for a longer period is better than a project that provides the same annual rate of return for a shorter period. Arguably one might use the total above-normal return rather than the annualized rate of return as the dependent variable. However, using plausible values for the normal rate of return, the estimated results are very similar to those for annual rates of return.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we provide formal representations of two hypotheses concerning the motivation for venture-capital syndication. One hypothesis, which we refer to as the selection hypothesis, is that venture capitalists syndicate in order to obtain a second opinion about the quality of a particular investment under consideration. We show that this hypothesis implies that rates of return should, other things being equal, be lower for syndicated investments than for standalone investments. The reason is that a second opinion is only needed on marginal investments. Projects that are obviously good can proceed without a second opinion. Therefore, standalone projects should exhibit the highest returns ex post.
The alternative hypothesis, which we refer to as the value-added hypothesis, is that syndication adds value to a given project. This implies that syndicated projects should have higher rates of return than standalone projects. The comparison between the selection hypo-thesis and the value-added hypothesis goes to the heart of the fundamental question as to what venture capitalists actually do. Do venture capitalists add value to projects, or do they merely select the more promising projects?
Our analysis clearly favors the value-added hypothesis, as syndicated projects have, on average, higher rates of return than standalone projects. The paper reports t-tests of the difference between two means and regression analysis, and the main result is clear despite the modest size of our dataset. The positive effect of syndication is signi cant in both the economic and the statistical sense. 11 We also report our attempt to control for several variables that might be expected to affect the regression. We also tried, but do not report, other speci cations.
Our empirical analysis does not imply that the value of a second opinion in making selections is absent. It merely means that the valueadded effect is empirically stronger than the selection effect. Thus our analysis suggests that venture capitalists do much more than just select promising projects; they also add value through management or other activities. Our analysis does rely on speci c assumptions. In particular, we assume that the lead venture capitalist makes the syndication decision. Thus the syndication decision is endogenous to the lead venture capitalist but exogenous to the venture. The models could have different implications if the venture (i.e., the entrepreneur) made this decision.
We also consider the role of risk aversion and risk sharing, as this might be an alternative explanation for the high returns to syndicated investments. We conclude that risk sharing might be important in some cases, but we do not have enough evidence to draw clear conclusions. Even if risk sharing is an important factor, however, we can still safely conclude that the selection effect is dominated by other considerations.
Appendix. Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 3. (i), suf ciency: First we prove the "if" part: that the conditions R > r and ' 0 are jointly suf cient for standalone investment. If R > r, then standalone investment is preferred to rejection, as d 21 is positive. If, in addition, ' 0, then d 32 < 0, which implies that standalone investment is preferred to syndication. Thus standalone investment is the dominant strategy.
11. The value-added hypothesis would be further supported if we could demonstrate empirically that syndicating venture capitalist s have skills complementary to those of lead venture capitalists , but we do not have appropriate variables in the data to test this idea.
(i), necessity: We now prove the "only if" part (i.e., that each condition is strictly necessary for standalone investment). If R r, then rejection is preferred to standalone investment. [Recall that rejection is assumed to be chosen in the event of ties (i.e., if h r).] Thus R > r is necessary for standalone investment. Furthermore, if ' v, then condition (5) implies that d 32 as given by (8) is positive, in which case syndication will be preferred to standalone investment. Thus ' 0 is also necessary for standalone investment.
(ii), suf ciency: The two conditions are jointly suf cient for syndication. Syndication will be chosen if d 31 and d 32 as given by (7) and (8) (ii), necessity: If ' v, then it must equal 0. If ' 0, it follows from (7) and (8) (7) cannot be positive (regardless of the value of ') and syndication cannot be chosen. Thus R > r v is also necessary.
(iii): This follows immediately from parts (i) and (ii) and completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. We refer to standalone investment as event T . Similarly, we refer to the event that syndication is chosen as event Y . We now calculate the expected value of expected payoff R for standalone investment, which is denoted E(R T ) . This expectation is given by 
We now need to calculate the expected rate of return on syndicated investments. This requires nding E(R 'Y ), which can be written 
The expected cash ow (to the syndicate) from syndication is given by (A4), and the expected cash ow from standalone investment is given by (A2). This difference, denoted D R, is
